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INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union sent
shockwaves across the continent of Europe. Many began wondering what
implications the UK’s secession, commonly referred to as “Brexit,” would
have on the future of the EU, on its 510 million citizens, and on the founda-
tional freedoms the European project was designed to protect.1 On June 23,
2016, the UK staged a referendum wherein 52 percent of voters opted for
the country to leave the other twenty-seven member states—freeing itself
from both the obligations and privileges that come with EU membership.2
This monumental departure, supported by pro-Brexit ‘Brexiteers’ for a
number of reasons, will have a long-term impact on the EU that is felt far
beyond the borders of the United Kingdom.
* Alumnus, University of St. Thomas School of Law, 2018.
1. EU DELEGATION TO THE US, THE EUROPEAN UNION: A GUIDE FOR AMERICANS 1–4
(2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/guide-for-americans_euintheus.pdf [hereinafter
DELEGATION].
2. JAMES K. JACKSON, ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44559, ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
OF A UNITED KINGDOM EXIT FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION 1 (version 5 July 14, 2016), https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44559 [hereinafter JACKSON ET AL.].
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A brief background is necessary to understand the wider context for
the Brexit decision, which some pundits recount as rash and illogical.
Michael Bloomberg called Brexit the “single stupidest thing any country
has ever done.”3 However, reflecting on some of the UK’s more pointed
critiques of the EU reveals a greater appreciation for the concerns held by
many across Europe. Those concerns include the belief that the EU has
overstepped its mandate and must be challenged now to preserve its more
fundamental values in the future. This paper explores what might become
of the European project in the wake of Brexit. “The EU faces a range of
political and economic pressures,” many of which are fueling the growth of
populist political parties across Europe, not just in the United Kingdom.4
There is anti-EU sentiment—a ‘euroskepticism’—bubbling beneath the sur-
face of many current member states, which calls into question the longevity
of the EU generally and the far-reaching arms of European law in
particular.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The European Union was founded on a shared desire for peace. Still
reeling from the devastation caused by World War II, six countries in West-
ern Europe, not including Britain, initiated a shared economic policy de-
signed to foster growth and recovery in the region.5 The European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) of 1951 was born and marked the beginning of
European integration.6 The ECSC countries created a single market by
handing over control of their coal and steel production to a supranational
authority,7 thus surrendering the raw materials that were needed to conduct
another war. The Schuman Declaration set out the vision for this new era,
stating, “World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative
efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.”8 It was envisioned
that solidarity in production and economic unity created through mutual
3. Graham Ruddick, Michael Bloomberg: Brexit is stupidest thing any country has done
besides Trump, GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/oct/24/
michael-bloomberg-brexit-is-stupidest-thing-any-country-has-done-besides-trump.
4. KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44249, THE EUROPEAN UNION: CURRENT
CHALLENGES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS, Summary (version 15 Feb. 27, 2017), https://crsreports.con
gress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44249/15.
5. Summary of Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC Treaty,
EUR-LEX, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:xy0022 (last up-
dated Nov. 12, 2017).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, Keynote Address at the Salon de l’Horloge at
the French Foreign Ministry to Propose European Integration: The Schuman Declaration (May 9,
1950), in Europa, at https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-
declaration_en.
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controls would make another European war “not merely unthinkable, but
materially impossible.”9
Over the next decades, this project expanded to become the European
Union and welcomed twenty-two other countries willing to surrender spe-
cific areas of their own sovereignty to benefit from the economic and social
freedoms provided by the body.10 Various treaties between the member
states established a robust single market. The treaties superseded national
laws to allow for the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people
across the bloc.11 Since founding these ‘four freedoms’ of movement, the
EU has evolved into a sprawling and complex system of common institu-
tions working to harmonize the laws among member states and secure a
more integrated Europe. The UK has historically struggled against this su-
pranational agenda for harmonization and jockeyed for more flexibility
within the increasingly uniform and regulated system.12
II. COMPETENCE CREEP
The EU has the legal authority to enact harmonization measures that
support the goal of a well-functioning and non-discriminatory internal mar-
ket. Harmonization is the principle of upholding the single market—ensur-
ing that laws across the member states are in concert with one another so
that every EU citizen has equal protection under the laws afforded to them
by the EU.13 This authority, also known as competence, implies a legal duty
on member states to enact consistently all laws and directives handed down
from Brussels.14 As treaties are signed, the EU institutions are endowed
with more authority to affect these laws.15 The EU legislative bodies exer-
cise these competences by forging agreements, writing laws, and issuing
directives, among other things.
9. Id.
10. See DELEGATION, supra note 1, at 44 (explaining that the United Kingdom, Ireland, and
Denmark were the first countries to join the original six-member community in 1973, with many
more joining thereafter).
11. Id. at 3.
12. See Theresa May’s Brexit speech in full: Prime Minister outlines her 12 objectives for
negotiations, INDEPENDENT UK, (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-
news/full-text-theresa-may-brexit-speech-global-britain-eu-european-union-latest-a7531361.html
(“[T]he European Union has struggled to deal with the diversity of its member countries and their
interests. It bends towards uniformity, not flexibility”).
13. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
114, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
14. Executive Summary of Legal Briefing from Marta Toporek on Behalf of Client Earth
(Jan. 20, 2010), https://www.documents.clientearth.org/wp-content/uploads/library/2010-01-01-
national-measures-and-the-ecodesign-and-energy-labeling-directives-ce-en.pdf.
15. Foreign & Commonwealth Office of the U.K., EU law and the balance of competences: A
short guide and glossary, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/eu-law-and-the-balance-of-competences-
a-short-guide-and-glossary (last updated Mar. 21, 2013).
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The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is tasked with interpreting EU
law in light of the supranational goals of harmonization.16 Decisions by the
ECJ highlight how pernicious this mandate for EU primacy has become.
Beginning in 1964, the ECJ ruled that EU law is supreme to any national
law.17 By 2008, the Court held that EU law superseded any international
agreement, and by 201318 the Court declared that EU law must take prece-
dent over national constitutions.19 This exemplifies how, over time, the
EU’s portfolio of competences has grown, incrementally stripping areas of
sovereignty away from the member states and creating a snowball effect
decried by many as “competence creep.”20
This growth and evolution, however, has not been without setbacks
and dissenters. Brexit brought a long-standing tension to a head; namely,
the tension between member states seeking an “ever closer union” in Eu-
rope and those member states who appreciate the benefits of the “four free-
doms” but prefer that the EU operate at a more intergovernmental level.21
Rather than forgo more of their nation’s sovereignty as the European pro-
ject marches forward, nations like Norway and Switzerland have refused
certain aspects of EU integration measures and have instead secured be-
spoke membership arrangements within the EU.22 The UK has done this to
a certain degree by declining to adopt the Euro or participate in the
Schengen area, for example, but the nation never attained the level of cus-
tom participation that it sought.23 As a result, the UK’s interest in removing
itself entirely from the EU continued to gather strength until it came to
fruition in the June 2016 referendum.
III. GROWING EUROSKEPTICISM
Though the underlying system of competence creep encapsulates many
of the UK’s frustrations with the EU, attempting to lay bare the full motiva-
tions behind the referendum lies beyond the scope of this paper. Relevant
here is what competence creep and the UK’s stance against it says about the
EU’s future. This section will demonstrate how Brexit is an external sign of
an internal euroskepticism festering within the bloc. First, the ever-increas-
16. ANTHONY BROWNE & MATS PERSSON, OPEN EUROPE, THE CASE FOR EUROPEAN LOCAL-
ISM 11 (2011), http://archive.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/PDFs/EUlocalism.pdf (refer-
encing the ECJ’s Treaty on European Union, Article 19, mandate to “ensure that in the
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed”). Critics of the ECJ’s growing
influence consider this a mandate to “pursue ‘ever closer union.’” Id.
17. Case T-6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 66.
18. Case C-402/05, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. 461.
19. Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, 2013 E.C.R. 107.
20. Bram van der Bruggen, The Charter and Creeping Competences: The Fear of the Mem-
ber States for the Charter of Fundamental Rights 4 (January 2011) (unpublished LL.M. thesis,
Tilburg University), http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=131643.
21. ARCHICK, supra note 4, at 4.
22. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 13.
23. ARCHICK, supra note 4, at 7.
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ing volume of EU regulations and ECJ decisions is evidence of the EU’s
continued encroachment on the sovereignty of member states. Next, the ac-
celerated pace with which the EU has adopted legislation, issued directives,
and broadened its reach through voluminous pro-European judicial deci-
sions has occurred at the same time that Europeans are becoming increas-
ingly more skeptical of the EU as a whole. Voter turnout in EU elections
continues to decrease, which demonstrates that average citizens are becom-
ing increasingly disengaged with what their supranational government is
doing. The expansion of EU governance, contrasted with a noticeable up-
tick in anti-Euro sentiment across the bloc, is a demonstrable trend that
threatens the ongoing trajectory of the European project.
A. Rising Tide of EU Regulations
It is undeniable that, over its history, the EU has issued a vast number
of laws.24 A challenge facing scholars, politicians, and analysts is determin-
ing just how vast the EU’s influence has become through these regulations.
Member states struggle to determine how many of their national laws exist
in whole or in part because of the EU.25 A significant challenge is determin-
ing what should be counted as EU law, i.e., ascertaining whether a certain
law was implemented by a member state, or already codified as a national
statute and therefore not attributable to the EU’s total influence.26 Article
288 of the Treaty on  the Functioning of  the European Union demarcated
five types of EU law (regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations,
and opinions), each imbued with varying degrees of binding authority.27
When Brussels issues one of these laws, the impact is felt differently across
the bloc depending on how each member state already complies with the
new legislation. For this reason, it is difficult to assess the total impact EU
legislation has had on any given member state. However, as the graph be-
low indicates, the number of EU actions taken by Brussels has clearly in-
creased over time. This demonstrates how the EU uses integratory methods
to accomplish its goal of creating an ‘ever closer union.’
24. Andy McSmith, 15 EU laws and regulations we will miss in post-Brexit Britain, INDE-
PENDENT (June 25, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-15-eu-laws-we-
will-miss-in-britain-a7103031.html.
25. Michael Bobek, The Effects of EU Law in the National Legal Systems, in EUROPEAN
UNION LAW 143, 145–175 (Catherine Barnard & Steve Peers eds., 2d ed., 2017), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2977530 (discussing the difficulties of determining “who enforces EU law in the Mem-
ber States, and how, following what procedures and guided by what principles”) (emphasis in
original).
26. UK HOUSE OF COMMONS, RESEARCH PAPER 10/62, HOW MUCH LEGISLATION COMES FROM
EUROPE? 1–2 (Oct. 13, 2010).
27. TFEU, supra note 13, art. 288.
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FIGURE 1: LEGAL ACTS ISSUED BY THE EU OVER TIME28
The data illustrates the EU’s robust legislative history. It is important
to note that law making, particularly through regulations and directives, has
declined in recent years. Each year, as more legislation is written, the EU
Council and EU Commission amend or repeal laws, while others expire
after being in effect for a short period of time.29 A commonly referenced
study published by the UK’s House of Commons in 2010 captures this phe-
nomenon.30 Though a similar data set has not been recreated more recently,
the following graph shows the net volume of EU legislation imposed on the
bloc. Net legislation offers a more conservative and accurate look into the
true impact of new EU legislation affecting member states because it in-
cludes all directives, regulations, and decisions issued while excluding leg-
islation that has been repealed or amended.
28. Dimiter Toshkov, 55 Years of EU Legislation Fig. 1 (last updated Feb. 2014), http://www
.dimiter.eu/Eurlex.html (This online presentation presents the research of Dimiter Toshkov, a
professor of social science and politics at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands. Professor
Toshkov’s 2014 study was derived from the EUR-Lex database.)
29. UK HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 26, at 13–14.
30. Id. at 13.
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FIGURE 2: NET EU LEGISLATION ADOPTED (1997–2009)31
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The growing number of laws and the ever-encroaching power of the
EU has led many to question the EU’s commitment to its own enshrined
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Article 5 of the Lisbon Treaty
confers on the Union competences that are governed by the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality.32 Subsidiarity means:
[T]he Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can
rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be
better achieved at Union level.33
Proportionality simply ensures that the Union’s “content and form . . . shall
not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.”34
To ensure that these principles were upheld and the rights of its mem-
ber states were preserved, the EU included a balancing mechanism in the
Lisbon Treaty. The process requires the EU to send draft legislation to na-
tional governments and provide them the opportunity to review and opine
revisions as each deems necessary.35 This serves as a check on the sub-
sidiarity principle, allowing member states to object to legislation from the
EU that imposes something at the supranational level that could be carried
out nationally. The Commission tracks the number of “reasoned opinions”
submitted annually by member states which directly challenge the Commis-
31. Id. at 15.
32. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5(1), March 30, 2010, 2010
O.J. (C 83) 13, 18 [hereinafter TEU].
33. Id. at art. 5(3).
34. Id. at art. 5(4).
35. BROWNE & PERSSON, supra note 16, at 9.
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sion on the principle of subsidiarity.36 The Commission received eight rea-
soned opinions in 2015.37 The following year, that number increased to
sixty-five challenges on subsidiarity38 and then dipped to fifty-two in
2017.39 This marks a 713 percent increase between 2015 and 2016 of mem-
ber states alleging that proposed EU legislation would violate the principle
of subsidiarity if enacted.
Despite this noticeable rise in member states concerned that the EU
was infringing on national sovereignty, the Commission’s recent reports in-
dicate that the balancing mechanism had little effect.40 The annual report
highlights the four proposals which received the most reasoned opinions. In
2016, 58 percent of all reasoned opinions challenged four Commission pro-
posals,41 whereas 2017 saw a different set of four proposals being chal-
lenged by 46 percent of all filed opinions.42 In each of the last two years,
high numbers of national Parliaments independently challenged the same
four proposals, yet the Commission declined to heed any of these common
objections, choosing instead to document the concern but ultimately imple-
ment the challenged proposals.43 The 2016 report concluded by affirming
that both the Council and Commission are “jointly committed to ensuring
that the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality remain at the heart of
European decision-making and that these principles are fully respected
throughout the legislative process.”44 However, after a purportedly careful
review, the Commission ultimately decided to “maintain its initial propo-
sal” while recognizing that “a number of national Parliaments remain un-
convinced of its merits.”45
This is a stark example of the EU’s brazen commitment to progress, no
matter the cost. In his 2016 State of the Union Address to the European
Parliament, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said, “Europe can
only be built with the Member States, never against them.”46 Yet the result
36. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 2016 ON SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
(2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:31af944c-5d70-11e7-954d-01aa75ed71
a1.0003.02/DOC_1&format=PDF [hereinafter COMMISSION 2016].
37. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 2015 ON SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
7 (2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:941754bf-4d09-11e6-89bd-01aa75ed
71a1.0005.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.
38. COMMISSION 2016, supra note 36, at 7.
39. COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2017 ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SUB-
SIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/annual-report-
2017-application-principles-subsidiarity-proportionality.pdf [hereinafter COMMISSION 2017].
40. Id.
41. COMMISSION 2016, supra note 36, at 7.
42. COMMISSION 2017, supra note 39, at 5.
43. Id.
44. COMMISSION 2016, supra note 36, at 16.
45. Id. at 17.
46. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 2016 ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EURO-
PEAN COMMISSION AND NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS 2 (2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html
?uri=cellar:186cfcb2-5d72-11e7-954d-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.
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seen in the 2016 Subsidiarity and Proportionality Report seems to contra-
dict this commitment. By failing to pause Brussels’ agenda and heed con-
cerns from its member states, the EU sends another signal that hesitancy
toward the European project is unwelcome. This form of lawmaking, which
asks for input and then ignores the response, undermines the whole project
and feeds a growing distrust for the EU shared by many across the bloc.
B. Large ECJ Involvement
The vital role played by the ECJ is perhaps a more telling, but often
less discussed, aspect of the EU’s method of harmonization. As discussed
above, the ECJ’s influence over European affairs is far-reaching. A growing
number of cases are being heard by the ECJ, whether directly or as referrals
from a national court.47 Direct actions and appeals from the EU’s General
Court made up approximately 36 percent of the ECJ’s proceedings between
2012 and 2016.48 The remaining 64 percent of the cases appearing before
the ECJ during these years came as References for a Preliminary Ruling.49
These are requests made by national courts that are seeking oversight from
the ECJ on how to accurately interpret EU law.50 In 2016 alone, 453 of 704
cases were referred to the ECJ by national courts.51 As European law and
EU competences grow, national courts are seeking help in a higher number
of domestic cases, which may only have a small nexus to EU law. Fearing
they will later be overruled by Europe’s high court, national courts opt for
this early oversight, which increases the ECJ’s opportunity to interpret law
in light of its mandate to harmonize and integrate Europe.52 The graph be-
low demonstrates the trend of increasing ECJ involvement, emphasizing the
growing influence of the Court on the European project.
47. COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, ANNUAL REPORT 2016: JUDICIAL ACTIV-
ITY 91 (2017), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-03/ra_jur_2016_en_
web.pdf [hereinafter ECJ 2016].
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. TEU, supra note 32, art. 19(3)(b).
51. ECJ 2016, supra note 47, at 91.
52. BROWNE & PERSSON, supra note 16, at 11 (see note 16 regarding interpretation of the
ECJ’s harmonization mandate).
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FIGURE 3: ECJ ACTIVITY OVER THE PREVIOUS TEN YEARS53
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Prominent leaders in Europe have voiced concerns that trending ac-
tions taken by the ECJ and other EU institutions are undermining the princi-
ple of subsidiarity and effectively stripping aspects of national sovereignty
away from member states. Germany’s former president, Roman Herzog,
long argued for the installation of a European Subsidiarity Court, which
would work to balance the overt Euro-centric agenda promulgated by the
ECJ.54 Long before Brexit, President Herzog wrote:
Judicial decision-making in Europe is in deep trouble. The reason
is to be found in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), whose jus-
tifications for depriving Member States of their very own funda-
mental competences and interfering heavily in their legal systems
are becoming increasingly astonishing. In so doing, it has squan-
dered away a large part of the trust it used to enjoy.55
This sentiment for the EU to honor its commitment to subsidiarity and
allow member states more autonomy in lawmaking is strongly held not only
by a majority of UK citizens, but also by many groups across Europe.56
High levels of regulations that supersede national law and the increased
influence exerted by the ECJ on national court systems are primary reasons
why the UK voted for the referendum. The continuing direction of the EU
53. ECJ 2016, supra note 47, at 87; see also COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
ANNUAL REPORT 2010 (2011), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-05/
ra2010_version_integrale_en.pdf.
54. BROWNE & PERSSON, supra note 16, at 11.
55. Roman Herzog & Lu¨der Gerken, Stop the European Court of Justice, EUOBSERVER, Sept.
8, 2008, https://euobserver.com/opinion/26714.
56. BROWNE & PERSSON, supra note 16, at 11–12.
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is also working to fuel disenchantment with the European project at large—
a skepticism not wholly unique to Britain.
C. Skeptical Citizenry
The UK’s pro-Brexit “Leave” campaign argued for separation from the
EU primarily due to concerns that Brussels was steadily eroding the na-
tion’s sovereignty for the reasons discussed above. It was argued that the
UK’s economy was stifled by both increased EU legislation and a rise in
immigration, which was required under the EU’s strict “freedom of move-
ment” principle.57 The majority of UK voters believe that the country
would be better off economically and otherwise if it had more control back
from Brussels with which to govern itself. Albeit varying in form and diver-
sity, this euroskepticism is the orientation of more populist, nationalist, and
antiestablishment political parties.58 Many of these parties have experienced
growing support across Europe in recent years due predominately to the
eurozone crisis and widespread economic stagnation.59
Brexit is the most austere anti-EU action taken by any member state to
date. However, the euroskepticism held by 52 percent of UK citizens repre-
sents an invasive undercurrent of similar sentiments spreading across Eu-
rope. Brexit was the first stone dropped into a large pool of member states
who too could grow dissatisfied enough to stage their own referendums.
Weeks before the UK’s referendum, the Pew Research Center con-
ducted a Europe-wide study attempting to quantify euroskepticism among
member states.60 The following three graphs capture different aspects of the
center’s 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Together they demonstrate how the
UK’s anti-EU sentiment is held, in varying degrees, across the bloc.
57. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 1.
58. ARCHICK, supra note 4, at 7.
59. Id.
60. Bruce Stokes, Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit: Significant opposition in key European
countries to an ever closer EU, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 7, 2016), http://www.pewglobal.org/
2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit/.
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FIGURE 4: FAVORABLE VIEW OF THE EU BY MEMBER STATES61
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“Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit”
In 2012 and 2013, favorability toward the EU plummeted in many
countries as the European economy experienced a downturn.62 There was a
brief rebound in 2014, but by 2016, public support for the EU in some of
the largest member states continued its marked decline.63 Despite its vote to
leave the EU, the United Kingdom has not experienced a dramatic decrease
in EU-sentiment relative to many of its more traditionally pro-European
partners. Since 2004, the UK lost 10 percentage points in public support for
the EU while France lost 31 points and Spain lost 33.64 Nations like France
and Germany, seen by many as the bedrock of Europe, are fostering grow-
ing distaste for the EU institutions they created.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id.
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FIGURE 5: FAVORABILITY OF THE EU ACROSS EUROPE65
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“Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit”
Shortly before the Brexit vote, the study indicated that 48 percent of
the UK disfavored the EU. Interestingly, a few weeks later, 52 percent of
UK voters opted to leave the Union, demonstrating an even higher rate of
euroskepticism than was reflected in this study. Similarly, though not tested
by a secession referendum, 48 percent of Germans during the spring of
2016 disfavored the EU—a high proportion, yet still trailing behind the 49
percent of Spaniards who disfavored the EU, 61 percent of French, and 71
percent of Greeks.66
Eurostat, an encyclopedia for European statistics, published a report
detailing how Europeans’ trust for EU institutions has declined over time,
increasingly so in recent years.67 The graph displayed in Figure 6 below
65. Id.
66. Stokes, supra note 60.
67. Sustainable development–good governance, EUROSTAT: STATISTICS EXPLAINED (July
2015), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:Sustainable_
development_-_good_governance&oldid=253022#Citizens.E2.80.99_confidence_in_EU_institu
tions [hereinafter Sustainable Development].
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shows how 42 percent of EU citizens trusted the European Parliament in
2014. This was still the highest amount of public trust held by any EU
institution. The European Commission garnered 38 percent of the public’s
trust in 2014 compared to the Council’s 36 percent and the European Cen-
tral Bank’s 34 percent.68
What this says about the potential for a similar referendum in one of
these member states is yet to be seen. It would be conclusory at this stage to
argue that rising anti-EU sentiment across Europe will certainly lead to sim-
ilar referendums. However, these numbers vividly illustrate the growing
tide of euroskepticism sweeping the continent and caution those who neg-
lect to see Brexit as a warning sign for Europe.
FIGURE 6: EU CITIZENS’ LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN EU INSTITUTIONS69
Further centralization of Europe, and thereby the degree to which national
sovereignty should be sacrificed, was at the heart of the Brexit decision and
continues in the overall debate for European reform.70 The Pew Research
Center survey found that Brussels’ pursuit of an “ever closer union” was
opposed by more citizens in six of ten nations than those who either sup-
ported the status quo or hoped to see greater centralization.71 More than
two-thirds of the populations in Greece and the UK wanted at least some
EU powers returned to the member states. This view was shared by a plu-
rality in Sweden (47 percent), the Netherlands (44 percent), Germany (43
percent), and France (39 percent).72 Conversely, far fewer citizens in these
countries want greater power for the EU, as seen in Figure 7 below. This
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Stokes, supra note 60, at 7.
71. Id. at 7 (referencing the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which founded the EU on a shared com-
mitment “to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”).
72. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\16-1\UST108.txt unknown Seq: 15 28-JAN-20 12:06
2019] BREXIT: HARBINGER OF CHANGE 125
contradicts the image often portrayed in present day media of the UK’s
dissent as inane and misguided. In fact, Brexit was simply the UK acting on
a perspective shared among many nations in Europe—a belief that Euro-
pean integration has gone far enough.
FIGURE 7: MEMBER STATE CITIZENS’ OPINIONS ON
AN “EVER CLOSER” UNION73
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“Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit”
D. Disengaged European Voters
Finally, widening euroskepticism can be seen in the decline of Euro-
pean voter participation. As shown in Figure 8 below, voter turnout has
dropped in every single European Parliamentary election to date.74 When
73. Id.
74. Results of the 2014 European elections, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Jan. 7, 2014), http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html [hereinafter Results].
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this figure again hit an all-time low in the EU’s most recent 2014 elections,
critics highlighted the glaring contrast between falling voter numbers and
growing EU power.75 Some point to the falling numbers as evidence of
Europe’s weakening democratic legitimacy, caused, at least in part, by in-
creasingly convoluted elections.76 One example of this is Brussels’ newly
created “Spitzenkandidaten” (leading candidates) system, which allows
pan-European parties to nominate leading candidates, who are then voted
on by Parliament, not directly elected by the populace.77 In this new system,
member states effectively “rubberstamped” the appointment of European
Commission President Juncker,78 a leader who now holds tremendous
power in Europe despite not being directly voted into office. Instead, he
was appointed by politicians for whom dwindling numbers of Europeans
even voted in the first place.79
The January 2017 election of Antonio Tajani as the European Parlia-
ment’s newest president is another example of political dealings contribut-
ing to Europe’s reputation as an opaque bureaucracy. Amid “searing
acrimony” felt widely by critics “over the deal-making that settled the out-
come,” Tajani’s election secured the European People’s Party (EPP) a com-
plete monopoly over the leadership of all three EU institutions—the
Parliament, the Commission, and the Counsel.80 After three rounds of mem-
ber voting failed to name a victor, the EPP’s monopoly was finally estab-
lished through an unusual fourth round of voting and “an 11th-hour deal”
between the EPP and the more liberal Alliance of Liberals and Democrats
for Europe (ALDE) party who withdrew its candidate and endorsed Tajani
in exchange for control over the Conference of Committee Chairs.81 Critics
argue that convoluted appointments like Juncker, fabricated elections like
Tajani, and the subsequent policy decisions being made through backdoor
channels among Brussels’ elite are creating a “democratic deficit” in
Europe.82
75. Martin Banks, Voter turnout in May’s European elections was the lowest ever, THE TELE-
GRAPH (Aug. 6, 2014, 12:06 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/
11015823/Voter-turnout-in-Mays-European-elections-was-lowest-ever.html.
76. Robert A. Pollard, Europe’s Struggle for Democratic Legitimacy: Voters Say No to EU
Super-State, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES (July 10, 2014), https://www.csis.org/analy
sis/europe’s-struggle-democratic-legitimacy-voters-say-no-eu-super-state.
77. Id.
78. Banks, supra note 75.
79. See Pollard, supra note 76 (“[S]ince only 43% of eligible voters took part in the election,
Juncker actually received the (indirect) support of less than 13% of the electorate. . . . Thus, none
of the candidates for Commission President could by any stretch of the imagination be described
as ‘the people’s choice.’”).
80. David M. Herszenhorn & Maı¨a De La Baume, And the winner is . . . a backroom deal
(and Antonio Tajani), Politico (Jan. 7, 2017, 10:22 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/european-
parliament-presidency-vote-election-and-the-winner-is-a-backroom-deal-and-antonio-tajani-epp/.
81. Id.
82. Pollard, supra note 76.
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FIGURE 8: VOTER TURNOUT IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS83
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This decline in voter participation is not endemic to all political
processes in Europe. Seen below, Figure 9 demonstrates that as voter partic-
ipation at the supranational level fell (42.61 percent), turnout across the
bloc was markedly higher in national elections (68 percent average).84 In
light of these ongoing trends of increased EU action coupled with simulta-
neous decreases in public opinion and voter participation, there is no reason
to expect the future will look any different for the EU, even after Brexit.
Absent major changes by the EU at both a general policy level and a more
granular statutory level, which affects these larger policy shifts, voters will
continue to disengage from European elections. In the euroskeptic’s view,
Brexit is an example of proactive national politics but offers no cognizable
incentive for average voters to engage more actively in their supranational
government, which many see as decreasingly democratic. Without demon-
strable and sustained change from the EU, Brexit will likely discourage
voter participation at the European level as time goes on.
In total, the figures detailed in this section highlight a thread of euros-
kepticism that can be traced throughout Europe. Long considered one of the
most euroskeptical members,85 the UK certainly contributes to these anti-
EU markings but does not lead the pack in all of the categories discussed.
This euroskeptic sentiment gained traction in the UK to such an extent that
a secession vote became a reality. With so many other member states shar-
ing in the UK’s skepticism, future dissenters willing to balk at Brussels’
agenda seem increasingly plausible. In many ways, Brexit symbolizes this
shared perspective coming to fruition.
83. Results, supra note 74.
84. Sustainable Development, supra note 67.
85. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 1.
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FIGURE 9: VOTER PARTICIPATION BY ELECTION TYPE86
IV. BREXIT AS A SIGNPOST
Grasping a moment in time and predicting what history will say about
it is a difficult feat, particularly when politics seem to shroud the interpreta-
tion of every fact and figure. A more global perspective, at a time like this,
offers some credence to the Brexit campaign, yet not in a way that reveals
all of the underlying motivations that led to this result. Instead, such a per-
spective helps garner appreciation for how euroskepticism, having found its
voice in the United Kingdom, is rooted in something much deeper, which is
echoing across the EU and around the world.
A dark cloud hung over humanity much of the twentieth century.87
After two world wars, the brutal genocides of Hitler and Stalin, Hiroshima,
and the gripping tension felt in the Cold War, the world heaved a sigh of
relief when communism fell in the winter of 1989. A collective optimism
took hold, couched in an expectation that regressive evil had ceased, and
liberal democracy would usher in untold freedom and opportunities for all.
Globalization, as it became known, was the conduit for this unbridled pro-
gress. Robert Kagan writes: “The years immediately following the end of
the Cold War offered a tantalizing glimpse of a new kind of international
order, with nation-states growing together or disappearing altogether, ideo-
logical conflicts melting away, cultures intermingling, and increasingly free
commerce and communications.”88 Australian writer Mark Sayers argues
that this new utopian vision, made possible by globalization, began as a
86. Sustainable Development, supra note 67.
87. MARK SAYERS, STRANGE DAYS, 41–60 (2017).
88. Id. at 59–60, quoting ROBERT KAGAN, THE RETURN OF HISTORY AND THE END OF
DREAMS 1 (2009).
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collective desire for economic order accomplished by connecting the world
through immigration and trade.89
As a reaction to globalization and western materialism, the world ex-
perienced a feverish rise in Islamic terrorism, culminating in the birth of
ISIS, and the subsequent anti-immigrant rhetoric that came as a result of the
ensuing panic.90 The UK’s decision to leave the European Union came
from its desire to close its borders and control its own destiny. A few
months later, Donald Trump was elected president of the United States with
an unapologetic “America First” platform. Trump’s campaign mirrored
many of the same populist and nationalist sentiments that prevailed in the
UK leading to the Brexit vote.91
Similar movements are gaining momentum across Europe as well. In
the EU’s 2016 Parliamentary election, populist parties garnered 13.2 per-
cent of the vote (compared to 5.1 percent in the 1960s), securing leadership
in eleven European countries.92 Austria’s recently elected President Sebas-
tian Kurtz, though not a far-right candidate, has taken a clear anti-immi-
grant and anti-Muslim stance in his country.93 Neighboring Hungary
erected a fence along its southern border to curb the flow of refugees—a
move led by the nation’s overtly nationalist Prime Minister Viktor Orba´n.94
The Netherlands’ alt-right candidate Geert Wilder and France’s Marine Le
Pen both lost presidential elections this year, but became top political con-
tenders while running on platforms focused on nationalism and anti-immi-
gration. Le Pen drove home the correlations between Brexit and Trump,
aligning herself with their shared underdog and nationalist narratives, pro-
claiming that the British and the Americans “made possible the impossi-
ble.”95 A populist movement in Italy this year forced Prime Minister Matteo
Renzi to resign.96 German Chancellor Angela Merkel, lauded as Europe’s
“last bastion of liberal democracy,”97 was elected to her fourth term in the
fall of 2017, beating back a rising populist movement. A mere ten months
89. Id. at 50.
90. Id. at 43.
91. STEVEN PINKER, ENLIGHTENMENT NOW: THE CASE FOR REASON, SCIENCE, HUMANISM,
AND PROGRESS 334 (2018) (Pinker argues that “[n]othing captures the tribalistic and backward-
looking spirit of populism better than Trump’s campaign slogan: Make America Great Again.” He
contends that it was a similar populist agenda, which served to catalyze the Brexit referendum.).
92. Id.
93. Editorial Board, In Election, Austria’s Nazi Past Raises Its Head, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/opinion/austria-election-sebastian-kurz.html.
94. Andras Schweitzer, Why Viktor Orba´n has a problem turning his country against immi-
grants, GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/08/
viktor-orban-immigrants-hungary-immigration-fears-pro-eu.
95. Simon Shuster, The Populists, TIME (2017), http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-pop
ulism/.
96. Id.
97. Anders Corr, Liberal Democracy Against A World Of Nationalist Happenstance, FORBES
(Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2016/11/21/liberal-democracy-against-
a-world-of-nationalist-happenstance/#64bd0bae43ec.
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earlier, a November 2016 poll found that 42 percent of Germans wanted to
stage their own referendum on EU membership.98 Norbert Roettgen, a se-
nior advisor in Merkel’s party, captured the political climate well: “What
we are seeing is a re-emergence of state egotism and nationalism. This is
our disease, and it goes right to the foundations of the European idea.”99
Burgeoning populist and nationalist movements are not unique to Eu-
rope and the United States, however. In Hong Kong, the Chinese govern-
ment recently thwarted secession efforts of a growing populist party by
preventing two of its pro-independence politicians from taking office.100 In
the Philippines, recently elected President Rodrigo Duterte brought a wave
of iron-clad populism to the island nation, promising quick solutions and
openly challenging the status quo set by the “elite.”101 These are only a few
examples, but they demonstrate a harrowing trend gaining influence across
the globe.
Opting not to construct physical walls to keep migrants from entering
their countries, some nations are instead erecting cultural barriers. In 2011,
France became the first European country to ban the full-face Islamic veil,
worn by women in public places.102 Austria, Germany, Belgium, Italy, and
the Netherlands followed suit with their own laws restricting the use of
Islamic veils.103 Other European countries depict men kissing or women
bathing topless in advertisements to communicate to would-be migrants that
they would not be comfortable in Europe.104 Far more overt, six thousand
alt-right nationalist protesters flooded the streets of Warsaw, Poland, on the
nation’s independence day in 2017, chanting, “Refugees get out!” and hold-
ing signs painted with vividly xenophobic slurs.105 This nationalist senti-
ment has found its way as far as South Africa, where the same generation
that was freed from the racist oppression of the apartheid era is now com-
mitting acts of violence against immigrants from other parts of Africa.106
98. Shuster, supra note 95.
99. Id.
100. Deidre McPhillips, Elections You Should Care About in 2017, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REPORT (Jan. 19, 2017, 12:21 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/slideshows/key-
elections-in-2017?slide=2.
101. Agence France-Press, With Duterte win, global populism wave hits Philippines, RAPPLER
(May 1, 2016, 10:58 AM), https://www.rappler.com/world/global-affairs/132673-global-popu-
lism-wave-philippines-duterte.
102. The Islamic veil across Europe, BBC NEWS (May 31, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-13038095 (experts indicate that national security concerns also play a part in these
laws).
103. Id.
104. Sayers, supra note 87, at 44.
105. Matthew Taylor, ‘White Europe’: 60,000 nationalists march on Poland’s independence
day, GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/12/white-europe-
60000-nationalists-march-on-polands-independence-day.
106. South Africa anti-immigrant violence: Hundreds held, BBC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2015), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32372501.
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These examples, among many, demonstrate how this disrupted utopian
vision of globalized harmony is somersaulting into new forms of populist
and nationalist discord around the world. This is not to conclude that the
Brexit decision was inherently xenophobic or isolationist. Despite the gen-
eral narrative espoused by popular media, which consistently aligns all pro-
Brexit motivations with these values, it is important to identify legitimate
from illegitimate goals—distinguishing patriotism from nationalism, eco-
nomic protectionism from anti-immigrant rhetoric, and a call for self-deter-
mination and true democracy from isolationism and withdrawal. Carefully
analyzing competing motivations, while seeking to understand Brexit from
a European, and then briefly from a global, perspective reveals a real possi-
bility that this watershed moment for Europe is a signpost of more chal-
lenges to come for the EU and perhaps for the rest of the world. In light of
the anti-integration sentiments swirling the globe, the EU has an opportu-
nity and responsibility to react and restructure in a way that realigns its
mission for peace with the changing landscape of the present day.
V. CONCLUSION
The European Union is at a crossroads because of Brexit. If Brussels
ignores this signpost of impending change, perhaps there will be no imme-
diate consequences, but the European project is facing a period of serious
questioning and could even be headed toward devolution if the trends dis-
cussed in this paper continue. However, if the EU rises to meet these chal-
lenges and is willing to amend some of its laws and much of its
bureaucratic culture, the European project, post-Brexit, could emerge
stronger than ever. To do this, the EU must curb its advancing legislative
agenda in ways that honor its principles of subsidiarity and proportionality
so that member states are empowered to play a more active role in the
future of Europe. The ECJ’s harmonization mandate must be amended so
that judicial interpretation no longer serves to further the unenumerated al-
lure of European progress. Finally, the EU must work to quash Brussels’
blatant reliance on backdoor political dealings and to bring its democratic
processes into the light if voter participation and general citizen enthusiasm
for the European project are ever to recover.
Brussels may choose not to heed the warning signs and instead carry
on with the European project as usual. By doing this, however, the EU will
simply be stoking the embers of euroskepticism that glow beneath the sur-
face of an increasingly hollow democracy. Brexit is the breeze that will
keep these embers glowing and may become the wind that bursts them into
flame.
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